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Abstract This paper explores the optimal expenditure rate that a firm should
employ to develop a new technology and pursue the registration of the related
patent. Our model takes into account an economic environment with indus-
trial competition among firms operating in the same sector and in presence
of uncertainty in knowledge accumulation. We develop a stochastic optimal
control problem with random horizon, and solve it theoretically by adopting
a dynamic programming approach. An extensive numerical analysis suggests
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1 Introduction
The decision to develop a new technology and -once it has been fully developed-
the selection of the appropriate time for taking out a patent are very complex
issues. On the one side, the sooner the firm takes the patent out, the sooner
it earns exclusive rights in production and commercialization of the patented
good. On the other side, patenting requires a very costly commitment of re-
sources in the Research and Development (R&D) phase, and introducing a
new product in the market also implies to face a highly uncertain demand
for it. For these reasons R&D investments must be thoroughly phased in by
R&D intensive firms. In addition, R&D investment decision entails a dy-
namic decision making process and it represents a very relevant topic, given
the huge amount of money at stake. Thus, the issue has attracted much at-
tention in the literature. Related models can be grouped into two streams.
The first is mainly concerned with the qualitative characterization of the time
pattern of R&D expenditure rate over the completion time of the project.
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The decision making process is analyzed in a context of a single firm with-
out rivalry [8,10,17,26,30,33]. The second stream considers R&D activities
in a competitive setting. Some contributions deal with a static context [9,21],
others with a multi-stage approach [18,25,34] and, more recently, taking ad-
vantage of optimization theory with a continuous framework [11,15,27,28,31,
37].
In this paper, we take the stance of a R&D intensive firm which has to decide
its optimal investment policy with flexible termination time in an uncertain
and competitive environment. Investing resources will produce a (possible, not
sure) benefit in the future, against a sure commitment of resources now. This
tension is at the basis of investment decisions. The investment policy can be
considered as optimal whenever it maximizes the expected discounted net re-
turn from the project. In particular, we face the issue of the optimal selection
of the expenditure rate to be employed by a firm to develop R&D policies
as a stochastic optimal control problem. As in [1,16,38] and the ensuing lit-
erature, the state variable is modeled as a controlled diffusion process, and
it is supposed to be evaluated at any point in time during its conduct. The
state variable, i.e. the project status, is measured in terms of the monetary
value of knowledge accumulated by the firm’s R&D program, in comparison
with other competing products currently in the market. The presence of com-
petition is formalized through the introduction of an exogenous random time
representing the date in which a rival wins the race. In doing this, we are
consistent with the common practice followed in the literature to model com-
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petition as a random negative sudden occurrence.1 Net of the presence of this
negative jump, we assume the state variable to follow a geometric Brownian
motion dynamics and we largely motivate the plausibility of this assumption
from an economic point of view. The control variable is the aforementioned
expenditure rate. It is assumed to be a stochastic process which describes the
monetary outflow dedicated to R&D, hence feeding deterministically into the
value of the state variable. More specifically, the drift term of the state variable
accounts for diminishing returns due to increased R&D efforts. The horizon of
the problem is random, in that the natural conclusion of the R&D process can
occur for three different reasons: i) the firm abandons the project; ii) the firm
takes out the patent; iii) a rival preempts the firm. The first and the second
case occur when the monetary value of knowledge accumulation reaches one of
the two opportunely selected thresholds (i.e. at a pre-specified exit time), while
the third case occurs -as already said- at a given stopping time. Unlike many
models in the literature, including those incorporating uncertain knowledge
accumulation [15,32], in which optimal expenditure on R&D is either zero or
at the maximum permitted rate, in this model the optimal expenditure rate
is assumed to vary over time with the level of accumulated knowledge. This
makes the model more interesting and more realistic, as well as more difficult
to solve.
To solve the optimal control problem, we adopt a strategy based on the deriva-
tion of a maximum principle, namely Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP).
1 Typically, the rival’s success is modeled as a negative Poisson jump [1,28,35,37,38].
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Moving from DPP, we prove that the value function is a classical solution of a
particular second-order ordinary differential equation -the so called Hamilton
Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation- and then we derive the optimal strategies in
feedback form through a Verification Theorem. The solution procedure offers
several mathematical difficulties. Firstly, the introduction of a stochastic hori-
zon in the problem invalidates a great part of dynamic programming theory as
commonly known in the literature. To deal with this point we rely on a result
recently proved in [7], which formalizes a DPP for a wide class of stochastic
control problems with exit time. Secondly, the HJB equation is claimed in
a formal sense, i.e. the value function is assumed to be twice differentiable.
Unfortunately, the value function is not generally regular enough. Hence, a
preliminary discussion on the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the
HJB equation in a weak -namely viscosity- sense is needed. This step is in line
with several works dealing with viscosity solutions of HJB equations in the
context of optimal control problems [12,24]. Existence and uniqueness theo-
rems for viscosity solutions of HJB equations in presence of stochastic horizon
can be found in [4,5], just to cite some prominent contributions. Thirdly, the
regularity of the value function is an aspect of central relevance in the entire
model. In order to prove the twice differentiability of the value function, we
first prove that it belongs to a certain Sobolev space, and then we derive the
thesis by opportunely applying an embedding theorem.
In general, stochastic optimal control problems are very complex because of
their dynamic and stochastic nature, high dimensionality and the presence of
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complex constraints. Nevertheless, in our specific context explicit solutions are
available. However, in order to provide some economic insights, we propose the
validation of the theoretical framework through an extensive numerical analy-
sis. In particular, a numerical algorithm is provided, and a sensitivity analysis
of the optimal expenditure rate is presented. This numerical scheme is based
on the finite difference discretization of the HJB equation, coupled with a fixed
point scheme to deal with its non-linearity.
One of the main predictions of the model consists in a declining expendi-
ture rate over time. This finding is consistent with [11,19] who find that the
equilibria investment rates should decrease in time. Differently, the result con-
tradicts the one presented by Zuckerman and coauthors in [33,37], where, in
a set up close to ours, the authors find the expenditure rate to be monoton-
ically increasing over time. As we will see below, the difference between the
contributions of Zuckerman and coauthors and our paper is mainly due to
a modeling assumption on the knowledge accumulation. The behavior of the
expenditure rate is further characterized by the analysis of its sensitivity with
respect to uncertainty in knowledge accumulation. In particular, the firm’s
reaction to changes in uncertainty is contingent upon the stage of the race.
That is, an increase in uncertainty will engender a limited increase in the rate
when the race is in an early stage. Conversely, the increase in the rate will be
higher if the change in uncertainty occurs in a later stage. Yet, uncertainty
in knowledge accumulation affects in a non-linear fashion the odds for the
firm to preempt the rivals. The higher uncertainty, the higher the odds when
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competition is severe, conversely under mild competition. As a consequence
of these results, it follows a prescription in terms of policy interventions. If
authorities’ intervention increases uncertainty about the returns to R&D in
the near future, the resulting movement of the aggregate investment rate is
unpredictable, depending on some instances such as: the stage of the race, the
degree of competitiveness in the market and their combinations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the economic issue we want
to deal with and presents the model. Section 3 solves the control problem by
employing a dynamic programming approach. Section 4 analyzes the sensi-
tivity of the numerical solution with respect to some relevant parameters of
the model. Section 5 discussing the results obtained draws some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a patent protection decision model for a firm operating in a
stochastic environment with competition. The decision is modeled as a so-
lution of a stochastic optimal control problem. At this purpose, we firstly
introduce a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ) on which we define a
standard Brownian motionW with respect to {Ft}t≥0 under P . The filtration
{Ft}t≥0 represents the P -augmentation of the natural filtration generated by
W , that is Ft = σ
(
W (s) | s ∈ [0, t]
)
∨ N , ∀ t > 0, where N is the collection
of all the sets of measure zero under P , i.e. N :=
{
A ∈ F : P (A) = 0
}
. Since
the Brownian motion is a continuous process, then {Ft}t≥0 is right continuous.
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Hence, the usual conditions apply to the filtration.
Let X = {X(t)}t≥0 be a stochastic process representing the time-dependent
monetary value of the technological knowledge accumulated by the firm’s
R&D program, in comparison with other competing products currently in
the market. We will refer to X simply as technological knowledge, representing
the state variable of the problem. Its evolution is assumed to be driven by a
controlled stochastic differential equation with initial data as follows:
dX(t) = α(C(t))X(t)dt + βX(t)dW (t) ∀ t > 0; X(0) = x, (1)
where i) β ∈]0,+∞[ is the volatility term of the process X . It may capture
fluctuations in X due to layoffs and/or to the monetary component, such as:
changes in taxation, exchange rate depreciations, new criteria for the evalua-
tion of knowledge accumulated, etc. ii) C = {C(t)}t>0 represents the expen-
diture rate. It is modeled as a stochastic process with support [0, 1] such that
C(t) is Ft-progressively measurable, for each t > 0. iii) α : [0, 1] → [0,+∞[
describes the growth rate of the value of knowledge accumulated, it is an in-
creasing and strictly concave function in ]0, 1[ representing diminishing returns
due to increased R&D efforts. iv) x ∈ [0,K] is a real number representing
the initial value of the technological knowledge, where 0 and K represent the
absorbing barriers of the dynamics. In particular, 0 is associated to the bad
situation in which a similar technology is introduced and protected by a firm’s
rival, while K represents the situation in which the firm takes out the patent
first.
Equation (1) constitutes one of the main building block of the model. For
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this reason we further motivate the economic plausibility of our modeling as-
sumption. In [38] it is pointed out that a diffusion process can be successfully
employed to describe the monetary value of accumulated knowledge. Interest-
ingly, this viewpoint also appears to be natural from more practical consider-
ations as reported in [29] for the remarkable case of Sony. Furthermore, [2,6]
show that firms not only learn, but also forget because of turnover and layoffs.
It follows that, if there is organizational forgetting, a firm’s stock of experi-
ence can decrease over time, and the ups and downs of the process in (1) can
capture this realistic feature. Differently, assuming a one-sided non-decreasing
process, as in [33,37], most of the features just mentioned could not be cap-
tured. By assuming α(C(t)) increasing and strictly concave we are consistent
with the empirical findings that document decreasing returns to scale in R&D
[13]. In particular, it represents the deterministic component of knowledge ac-
cumulation, deriving from the expenditure in R&D. Put differently, when a
firm invests a given amount of money it cannot precisely know how much of
the expenditure will turn into knowledge, but this piece of information can
be known up to a certain level of (un)certainty. The deterministic drift plays
this role in the sense that it represents the deterministic yield of the R&D
investment, although at a decreasing rate, while β captures the remaining un-
certainty in knowledge accumulation, i.e. in R&D returns.
Given this premise, we analyze the patent race played by the firm up to the
registration of the patent. The timing of the end of the race is unknown and
depends on the stochastic dynamics of X in (1). Therefore, we need to in-
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troduce the random times at which the process X reaches the absorbing bar-
riers 0 or K. We denote by T the set of the stopping times in [0,+∞] as
T := {η : Ω → [0,+∞] : {η ≤ t} ∈ Ft, ∀ t ∈ [0,+∞)}, while the exit time
τ of the dynamic from ]0,K[ is τ := inf
{
t ∈ [0,+∞] : X(t) /∈]0,K[
}
. Since
{Ft}t≥0 satisfies the usual conditions, it follows that τ ∈ T . We also denote as
σ ∈ T the random time at which a firm’s rival beats the firm, i.e. it introduces
and protects a similar (or the same) technology.
To try to win the race, the firm can act optimally by deciding its expenditure
rate. That is, it can optimally set a stochastic expenditure at time t as a share
of X(t) devoted to R&D. Hence, the admissible region, i.e. the functional
space containing the admissible controls, can be defined as follows:
A :=
{
C : [0,+∞)×Ω → [0, 1], Ft − progressively measurable processes
}
.
The objective of our analysis is to maximize the firm’s expected discounted
net returns. At this purpose, it is necessary to distinguish some occurrences.
On the one side, if the value of technological knowledge reaches the absorbing
barrier K before σ, the technology developed is protected and introduced in
the market by the firm. In this case P (τ < σ) = 1 and a monetary return,
MK > 0, accrues to the firm. This amount can be interpreted as the benefits
from the innovation produced by the patent. On the other side, if the value of
technological knowledge reaches the absorbing barrier 0, or equivalently if a
rival firm introduces and protects the innovation first, we consistently assume
that X(σ) = 0 for P (τ = σ) = 1. In this case, the monetary return to the
firm is M0 ≥ 0. Of course, MK > M0. The paradigmatic case of M0 = 0
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corresponds to the winner-takes-all hypothesis, and will be discussed below.
To play the race, at each point in time t, the firm incurs the R&D expenses
C(t)X(t), until the exit time σ ∧ τ . The optimal expenditure rate C∗ ∈ A can
be found by maximizing the firm’s expected discounted net value J , defined
as follows: J : [0,K]×A → R such that
J(x,C) = Ex
{
Λ(X(σ ∧ τ))e−δ(σ∧τ) −
∫ τ∧σ
0
e−δtC(t)X(t)dt
}
,
where Λ(0) =M0 and Λ(K) =MK , i.e. Λ maps the technological attainment
at the end of the game into the monetary value of the prize. We also denote
with Ex the expected value conditioned on X(0) = x and e
−δ is a continuous
uniperiodal discount factor, with δ > 0. The value function V : [0,K]→ R is
V (x) := sup
C∈A
J(x,C). (2)
3 Dynamic Programming and Optimal Strategies
The control problem described in the previous section is solved by adopting a
dynamic programming approach. To this aim, we refer to [7], in which a DPP
for a rather wide class of optimal control problems with random horizon has
been proved. Hence, here we state the DPP by adapting [7] to our case:
Theorem 3.1 (DPP) For each η ∈ T , we have
V (x) = sup
C∈A
Ex
[
−
∫ η∧σ∧τ
0
e−δtC(t)X(t)dt + e−δ(η∧σ∧τ)V (X(η ∧ σ ∧ τ ))
]
.
From Theorem 3.1, the HJB equation can be directly derived. Such an equation
is stated formally, in the sense that the value function V in (2) is a classical
solution of the HJB equation only under the necessary regularity conditions.
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Theorem 3.2 (HJB Equation) Suppose that V ∈ C0([0,K]) ∩ C2(]0,K[).
Then
δV (x) = x sup
c∈[0,1]
{α(c)V ′(x) − c}+ 1
2
β2x2V ′′(x), ∀ x ∈]0,K[, (3)
with the relaxed boundary conditions for x ∈ {0,K}:
min
{
δV (x)−x sup
c∈[0,1]
{α(c)V ′(x) − c}− 1
2
β2x2V ′′(x), V (x)−Λ(x)
}
≤ 0, (4)
and
max
{
δV (x)−x sup
c∈[0,1]
{α(c)V ′(x)− c}− 1
2
β2x2V ′′(x), V (x)−Λ(x)
}
≥ 0. (5)
The proof is rather standard, and is omitted. Existence and uniqueness of the
classical solution of the HJB equation (3) with boundary conditions (4)-(5)
are needed in order to obtain the optimal strategies of the control problem.
The following theorem guarantees such conditions. The proof is quite technical
and for this reason it is confined to the electronic supplementary material.
Theorem 3.3 The value function V in (2) is twice differentiable in ]0,K[,
continuous in [0,K] and it is the unique solution of HJB equation (3) with
variational boundary conditions (4) and (5).
Theorem 3.3 states that V is the unique classical solution of the HJB equa-
tion. This fact turns out to be useful in formalizing optimal strategies and
trajectories, which can be theoretically identified by means of the Verification
Theorem stated below:
Theorem 3.4 (Verification Theorem) Assume u ∈ C0([0,K])∩C2(]0,K[)
to be a classical solution of (3). Then the following statements hold true:
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(a) u(x) ≥ V (x), ∀x ∈ [0,K].
(b) Let us consider (C∗, X∗) an admissible couple at x such that
C∗ ∈ arg sup
c
{α(c)V ′(X∗(t))− c} .
Then (C∗, X∗(t)) is optimal at x if and only if u(x) = V (x), ∀x ∈ [0,K].
See the electronic supplementary material for the proof. We notice that the
Verification Theorem is grounded on the regularity of the value function, which
is a classical solution of the HJB equation. This fact highlights the usefulness
of Theorem 3.3. The next step consists in providing an explicit form of the
optimal strategies and trajectories through the so-called closed loop equation:
Theorem 3.5 Consider
C∗(x) =


1, for x such that V ′(x) ∈]−∞, 0∗,
min
{
I
(
1
V ′(x)
)
, 1
}
, otherwise.
where I is the inverse function of α′. Denote as X¯ the solution of the closed
loop equation dX¯(t) = α(C∗(X¯(t)))X¯(t)dt + βX¯(t)dW (t), X¯(0) = x. Then,
by setting C¯(t) := C∗(X¯(t)), we have J(x, C¯) = V (x) and the pair (C¯, X¯) is
optimal for the control problem.
The proof stems from the Verification Theorem, starting from the existence
and uniqueness of the solution of the state equation (1). Theorem 3.5 explicitly
determines the optimal strategies for our stochastic control problem.
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Fig. 1 Value function (up), optimal expenditure rate (middle) and optimal expenditure
(down) as a function of x: K = 10, MK = 10, β = 0.4 (left), β = 0.05 (right) and α(c) =
√
c
4 Sensitivity Analysis
The experiments2 are carried out considering α(c) =
√
c. Similar results are
obtained also considering other grow rate functions, e.g., α(c) = c2/3. The-
oretical results allow us to derive some interesting static sensitivity analysis.
Specifically, the expenditure rate C∗(x) in Theorem 3.5 can be studied3.
First of all, we assume K = 10 and MK = 10. Figures 1-2 show the optimal
expenditure rate and the optimal expenditure as functions of the initial data
x along with the value function, for different values of δ and β, considering
α(c) =
√
c. We notice that: i) higher values of δ make the value function
shift downward, while both the optimal expenditure curves shift upward (see
Figure 1); ii) higher values of β engender a slight shift downward in the value
2 The HJB equation (3) is solved through a numerical procedure based on a finite differ-
ence scheme. Details of the procedure and the Matlab code are reported in the electronic
supplementary material.
3 Some theoretical results on the behavior of C∗ have been derived for four special cases
of the α function. See the electronic supplementary material for details.
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Fig. 2 Value function (up), optimal expenditure rate (middle) and optimal expenditure
(down) as a function of x: K = 10, MK = 10, δ = 0.1 (left), δ = 0.01 (right), and α(c) =
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Fig. 3 Value function (up), optimal expenditure rate (middle) and optimal expenditure
(down) as a function of x: δ = 0.1, β = 0.4, K = 5 and α(c) =
√
c
function, and in the opposite direction for the expenditure curves (see Figure 2,
left panel); this effect is stronger for low values of δ (see Figure 2, right panel);
iii) for given δ and β, both the value function and the optimal expenditure are
increasing in the initial value of the technological knowledge, contrarily to the
optimal expenditure rate which slopes downward (see Figures 1-2).
In Figure 3 we analyze the behavior of our solution with respect to x for
different values ofMK , setting β = 0.4 and δ = 0.1. We notice that the higher
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the monetary return to the race, namely MK , the higher the value function
and the expenditure curves, as expected.
4.1 A Dynamic Sensitivity Analysis
The time-varying nature of the optimal expenditure rate {C¯(t)}t≥0 of Theorem
3.5 is here considered. To this purpose, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation
of the process (1). More precisely, we fix a starting value X0 = 2 and simulate
1,000,000 possible scenarios for the process {X(t)}t≥0. By means of the pro-
posed numerical scheme the optimal expenditure rate {C¯(t)}t≥0 is obtained
numerically, as C¯(t) = C∗(X(t)), for each simulated scenario {X(t)}t≥0.
Figure 4 shows the mean value of {C¯(t)}t≥0 over the scenarios and the optimal
total expenditure. The upper part of Figure 4 sets out that higher values of δ
correspond to higher expenditure curves, that is, higher discount rates make
the firm more eager to invest. As regard to the sensitivity with respect to β (see
the lower panel of Figure 4) in an early stage of the race the total expenditure
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β = 0.4 δ = 0.1 β = 0.4 δ = 0.1
δ = 0.01 δ = 0.1 β = 0.05 β = 0.2 δ = 0.01 δ = 0.1 β = 0.05 β = 0.2
σ Odds Expected time of success
4 8.82 38.92 9.48 34.36 3.03 2.90 3.86 3.39
6 21.54 69.93 100.00 87.71 4.21 3.79 4.34 4.26
8 34.44 86.48 100.00 98.84 5.25 4.38 4.34 4.53
10 45.62 94.02 100.00 99.37 6.17 4.75 4.34 4.57
Table 1 Odds and expected time (in case of success). Parameters as in Figure 4. Extended
results are reported in the electronic supplementary material.
seems scantly sensitive to β, while as the race proceeds it is higher for lower
values of β, conversely for the rate. Notice that both sensitivities of the expen-
diture, the positive one with respect to the discount rate and the negative one
with respect to uncertainty, are in line with the real options prediction, but
our stylized framework enables us to add more information to those results,
as we can trace the optimal investment over time, rather than considering it
as a lump sum cost. We will discuss this point in greater detail in Section 5.
In Table 1 we also report the odds, i.e. the chance that the firm takes out the
patent before σ, and the expected time of success -when success occurs, namely
when the firm takes out the patent- for different values of σ. The odds increase
as δ increases, because the latter brings about an increase in the total optimal
expenditure, whereas they decrease as β increases only for σ ≥ 5. Notice also
that, for a combination of low uncertainty and high discount rate (β = 0.05,
δ = 0.1) all the simulations obtain a success, i.e. Xt = K, within 6 years. We
will devote more attention also to this point in Section 5. Considering only the
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simulation for which the firm takes out the patent, it is worth noting that the
expected time of success is generally decreasing in δ. Whereas, the behavior of
the expected time of success with respect to β is rather mixed. In particular,
it increases with β when σ is large (σ ≥ 9), decreases when σ is small (σ ≤ 6)
and has an inverted U-shape for intermediate values of σ (7 ≤ σ ≤ 8).
5 Perspectives and Conclusions
Gathering the evidence and the regularities arising from the simulation we
can now characterize qualitatively the firm’s behavior in the race from two
points of view, namely the expenditure rate dynamics and the odds. These
key aspects are analyzed in terms of sensitivities to the model parameters
with particular emphasis on the effects of competition. As far as the expendi-
ture rate is concerned its characterizing features can be summarized as follows:
i) for given x, it is an increasing function of the discount rate (Figure 1); ii) it
is a decreasing function of the initial values of the knowledge, x (Figures 1-2).
This result is at odds with [33,37], in which the authors find an increasing
function of the knowledge accumulated both in a non competitive and in a
competitive environment, respectively. This sharp contrast is due to the fact
that the articles just cited consider {X(t)}t≥0 as a one-sided non-decreasing
jump process. Differently, in our context, being {X(t)}t≥0 supposed to evolve
as a diffusion process and, furthermore, being a relative measure of knowl-
edge accumulated, the path of {X(t)}t≥0 over time is not restricted to be
increasing. In addition, the result is consistent with [11], but it is important
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to stress that [11] claims that the result can be obtained by abandoning the
assumption of memoryless process for knowledge accumulation in favor of a
long-memory process. Here, we prove that the same result can be achieved by
still adopting a memoryless process, such as in (1), coupled with decreasing
returns to scale in R&D. Moreover, iii) the sensitivity of C¯(t) with respect
to uncertainty in knowledge accumulation, which is formalized through the
parameter β, changes over time, depending on the stage of the race. That is,
if an increase in uncertainty occurs, then the optimal expenditure rate will
scantly (remarkably) increase in an early (late) stage of the process (Figure
4). Finally, iv) the optimal expenditure rate is decreasing over time, steeper
in the initial part of the race and tends to flatten out subsequently (Figure
4). Again, this result is at odds with that in [33,37] in which the authors find
that the expenditure rate increases monotonically over time, and is consistent
with [11] and [19], in which the authors claim that the equilibria investment
rates should decrease in time.
From an economic standpoint, it is realistic to think of R&D as requiring a
remarkable effort in terms of resources invested; however, after a certain period
of time, the resources will reach a critical bulk, such that investment proceeds,
but at a declining or constant rate. This phenomenon is referred to as the pure
knowledge effect and is due to the fact that a firm’s past R&D efforts con-
tribute to increase the odds. This effect has important implications in terms of
strategic interactions. In particular, a firm that is behind in the race has the
possibility to catch-up. This pattern of strategic interactions is more consistent
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with action-reaction, rather than with increasing dominance, the latter being
characterized by increasing investments as resources are accumulated. Indeed,
empirical research [14,20,23,36] lend more support to action-reaction than in-
creasing dominance. In [22] the authors find a negative relationship between
R&D intensity and firm’s explorative activities, the latter being considered
as a proxy of knowledge accumulation. Moreover, the presence of the term
β in the process {X(t)}t≥0 captures a non negligible aspects of uncertainty
surrounding R&D investment decisions, as firms must consider rivalry dy-
namically, i.e. at any time t, not only in terms of the termination of the race
σ. Indeed, β plays this role, capturing the level of the dynamic competition
and contributes to reveal the decreasing path of the expenditure rate over
time. For this reason our results seem to be more realistic than those achieved
in [33,37], and this is due to the less restrictive assumptions put forth in the
present model.
As regard to the simulated odds, their behaviour is consistent with the op-
timal total expenditure path. For instance, an increase in the discount rate
brings about the expenditure rate to increase, in turn, making the odds in-
crease. A very interesting fact concerning the firm’s behavior in a competitive
environment arises from the role played by the uncertainty parameter β in the
knowledge accumulation dynamics. In particular, we have noticed that as β
increases the odds increase only when competition is more severe, i.e. small
sigma, σ < 5 in the simulation. This behavior can be explained in the light
of the fact that when competition is severe the chance for the firm to pre-
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empt the rivals are due mainly to the volatility of knowledge accumulation,
i.e. in presence of high riskiness as well as great opportunities. Put another
way, the deterministic component of the knowledge evolution, α(C(t))dt, does
not suffice to reach the level of knowledge enabling the firm to patent, but
it is needed a favorable random event, βdW (t), with β sufficiently large and
positive. Hence, in this situation the smaller β, the less likely the event to
occur. When competition is less severe, i.e. for larger values of σ, the effect of
the deterministic component becomes more relevant, increasing the chances to
take out a patent; hence, uncertainty is regarded as hindering this occurrence,
and higher β decreases the odds.
At this point it is straightforward that the firm’s behavior is crucially affected
by uncertainty and that its response depends on different instances, such as
high/low competition, early/late stage of the race and their interactions. It
follows that the effects of an increase in uncertainty about the future returns
to R&D caused by authorities’ intervention, such as uncertain and unclear
taxation rules, are unpredictable both in terms of aggregate investment, de-
pending on which stage the different competing firms are, and in terms of
firms achievements, depending on the degree of competition in the market.
This finding is consistent with the evidence arising from the European Frame-
work Program (FP), which is a policy program aimed at overcoming a set of
failures hindering the innovation process. This program is composed of a large
number of instruments4 and each instrument is designed in order to address
4 For a detailed list of the instruments contained in FP5 and FP6 see [3, Table 1].
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a certain given type of failure. In [3], on the basis of an empirical study, the
authors show that firms do not perceive the differences due to this variety of
instruments. Thus, the final effect of the program is unpredictable because
firms, from the policy maker’s point of view, do not appropriately select the
instruments, and the authors even claim that developing too complex instru-
ments is counterproductive. Last, but not least, keeping instruments simple
and stable over time should also reduce the costs of public administration.
As far as the value function is concerned, its behavior with respect to the
change in the parameters of the model is not surprising, as it monotonically
increases as the discount rate and the uncertainty parameter decrease, or the
initial value and the final prize,MK , increases. Being our attention focused on
the behavior of the optimal expenditure rate the response of the value func-
tion to the possible perturbations can be viewed as a sort of validation of the
results obtained for the expenditure rate.
To conclude, we believe that, although the patent race is a very complex phe-
nomenon entangled with multiple sources of uncertainty, the model presented
can be considered as capturing a realistic situation and moves a little, but
significant step ahead in the comprehension of this aspect of the industrial
economic field.
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